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The Bases of (Im)politeness Evaluations:  
Culture, the moral order and the East-West debate 
Helen Spencer-Oatey and Dániel Kádár 
To appear in East Asian Pragmatics, volume 1. 
 
Abstract 
Evaluation is an important aspect of (im)politeness and this paper explores it from an 
interdisciplinary perspective. It starts by considering the debate over the East-West debate in 
politeness theory and argues that both emic and etic approaches to research can contribute usefully 
to the deliberations. It then maintains that if we are to understand the impact of culture on people’s 
(im)politeness evaluations, we need to unpack the concept more thoroughly. It proposes that useful 
insights can be obtained from Haidt’s (e.g. Haidt and Kesebir, 2010) work on moral foundations and 
Schwartz’s (e.g. Schwartz et al., 2012) work on basic values. The paper ends by revisiting the East-
West debate, discussing the potential impact of other factors such as beliefs and ideologies, and 
noting the ongoing uncertainties over levels and links between the various concepts explored. It 
urges pragmaticists and psychologists to engage more fully with each other to help address these 
challenges. 
Keywords: 
(Im)politeness evaluation; East-West debate; moral order; cultural values; beliefs. 
1. Introduction 
According to the blurb about the journal of East Asian Pragmatics on the publisher’s website, the 
journal aims to focus on “language use and interpersonal interaction within and across East Asian 
cultures” and to form a bridge between “pragmaticians (sic) from East Asian and Western 
countries.”  This puts very explicit focus on east and west, and the notion of ‘culture’, which relates 
not only to national culture, but also to the cultures of all kinds of other groupings, including ethnic, 
minority and regional groups, as well as communities of practice.  It is important, therefore, to take 
stock of our understanding of the impact of culture on interpersonal interaction, and in this paper 
we focus particularly on its relation to (im)politeness evaluations and what Haugh (2013) and Kádár 
and Haugh (2013) call the moral order.  Our interpretation of the concept of morality is broad and is 
in line with that of the psychologists Haidt and Kesebir (2010) , who regard it as a system that 
regulates social life through psychological processes such as values, virtues, norms, and practices. 
It is now widely accepted that (im)politeness entails an evaluative judgement: we assess people to 
be polite or impolite, based on our interpretations of their behaviour/language. Our interpretations 
are not usually idiosyncratic, but rather relate to culturally-based expectations as to what is 
acceptable or unacceptable behaviour in the context in which it occurs. For example, suppose I do a 
big favour for a colleague at work and she does not thank me explicitly. If I think she ‘ought’ to have 
thanked me, I will evaluate her behaviour as impolite. Suppose I then tell another colleague about 
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her, and that person commiserates with me about her bad treatment of me. Three important things 
need to be noted from this hypothetical sequence of events. Firstly, I am making an evaluative 
judgement of the other person. Secondly, I am making the assumption that the second colleague 
shares my expectation that failure to express gratitude is impolite. Thirdly, our judgement of 
‘impoliteness’ relates to an implicit standard of behaviour that we both share – our moral order 
conception. 
It is quite possible, however, that people with different normative expectations may not evaluate 
the colleague’s behaviour in the same way. Gratitude can be shown in different ways, and so if I 
believe that gratitude is best conveyed not by words but by returning the favour later on, my 
evaluation of the colleague’s behaviour will be very different. So (im)politeness evaluations are 
inevitably closely associated with cultural norms and expectations. 
However, culture is a slippery construct. Eelen (2001, 169) refers to it as “a rather ramshackle 
construction which looks solid from the outside, and is highly adaptable to cover all different kinds 
of observations, but is best not asked to carry too much practical explanatory burden.” This is not 
surprising for, as Bond, Žegarac and Spencer-Oatey (2000) point out, any differences identified in 
cross-cultural pragmatic research are typically simply attributed to ‘cultural difference’, without any 
attempt to unpack this further. However, we disagree with Eelen’s viewpoint that we should not try 
to dig deeper into the issue of culture and (im)politeness. We believe it is an important issue not 
only conceptually but also interpersonally. So in this paper we focus on (im)politeness evaluations 
and explore how, and to what extent, conceptualisations of culture in psychology and anthropology 
may yield insights into the underpinnings of the ‘moral order’ foundations of such assessments.  
We start, though, by reviewing the cultural issue of the “East-West” debate in (im)politeness theory.  
2. The East-West debate    
For the last 30 years or so, there has been an ongoing debate around universal compared with 
culture-specific frameworks for conceptualising and analysing (im)politeness, with one perspective 
often being pitted against the other and with claims and denials that some perspectives are 
‘Western-biased’ and not applicable to ‘Eastern’ interaction. For example, the Japanese linguists, 
Matsumoto (1989) and Ide (1989) criticised Brown and Levinson’s (1978/1987) (henceforth, B&L) 
classic model of politeness over the universality of its claims. Matsumoto questioned B&L’s concept 
of face-threatening acts, and argued that all utterances in Japanese are potentially face-threatening, 
because a Japanese speaker always needs to make choices on language form that convey 
information about the perceived relationship between the interlocutors. So even a simple utterance 
like ‘Today is Saturday’ could be perceived as impolite if an inappropriate speech style was chosen.  
She concluded that the motivation for politeness put forward in B&L’s model is unsuited to the 
Japanese culture and language.  
 
On similar lines, Ide (1989) elaborated the concept of ‘discernment–volition’ as a critique of B&L 
(1987). She (1989) argued that a weak point in their universal model is its Gricean worldview, i.e. it 
relies on the idea that politeness comes into existence when the speaker flouts conversational 
maxims through the means-ends reasoning of individuals (i.e. that speakers use language in 
‘strategic’ ways, in order to trigger a certain inference associated with politeness). Drawing from the 
Japanese emic meta-term wakimae (‘discernment’), Ide (1989) argued that, in Japanese, one’s 
behaviour tends to be judged as polite when one discerns the appropriate communal norm that 
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applies in the situation, and that this overrides individual rationality. She maintained that this differs 
from the strategic means-ends reasoning of individuals that dominate ‘Western’ conceptualisations 
of politeness (a process that Ide labelled as ‘volition’). As a representative example for the operation 
of ‘discernment’, Ide described the Japanese honorific registers, which, according to her definition, 
tend to be used in non-strategic ways, as the interactants follow societal norms in the use of a given 
register in Japanese. Thus Ide (1989, p.243) argued that the B&L model reflects a “Western eye 
biased by individualism and the Western academic tradition of emphasizing rationality.”  
 
Shortly after this, two Chinese pragmaticists, Gu (1990) and Mao (1994), presented further criticisms 
of the B&L model. Gu (1990) argued that a) the B&L notion of ‘face’ is too simplistic to capture the 
Chinese culture-specific understanding of this concept, and that b) various aspects of Chinese 
politeness are formal and recurrent, and so they are neither ‘strategic’ in B & L’s sense, nor do they 
involve clearly negative or positive face-work (but rather an ambiguous amalgamate of the two). 
Mao (1994), in a similar vein to Gu, criticised the problematic nature of the concept of ‘face’ in B & 
L’s framework, by exploring the metapragmatic complexity of this notion in Chinese culture. The 
influence of Mao’s research might be illustrated by the fact that since the publication of his article, a 
variety of research papers have been devoted to the metapragmatic research of Chinese ‘face’ (e.g. 
Hinze, 2007; Ruhi and Kádár, 2011).  
Criticisms have not been limited to B&L’s model, though. For instance, Intachakra (2012) maintains 
that the ‘classic’ frameworks of Lakoff (1973) and Leech (1983) as well as B&L (1978/1987) all fail to 
account adequately for the ‘rapport-oriented’ rationality of many Eastern languages/cultures. Other 
researchers have drawn attention to language/culture-specific characteristics, suggesting that some 
aspects of (im)politeness may be core in one language/cultural group but not necessarily in another.  
For instance, Pan and Kádár (2011) argue that a basic criterion for an utterance to be treated as 
genuinely polite in Chinese interaction is its affective value and so they maintain that the Chinese 
concept of qing, which can be roughly translated as ‘affection’, ‘feeling’ or ‘sentiment’, is a core 
feature of politeness in Chinese.  Along the same lines, Haugh (2005) argues that ‘place’ is a key 
concept for accounting for politeness in Japanese: 
… politeness in Japanese arises primarily from acknowledging the place of others, or 
compensating for impositions on that place, rather than trying to compensate for possible 
impositions on the individual autonomy of others. 
Haugh, 2005, 45 
Yet other researchers (e.g. O’Driscoll 1996; Usami, 2002; Pizziconi, 2003, 2011; Fukada and Asato, 
2004; Chen, He & Lu, 2013), on the other hand, have maintained that there are no fundamental 
differences between Eastern and Western politeness. For example, Usami (2002) and Fudada and 
Asato (2004) each provide evidence that there is more variation in individual choice of language 
forms in Japanese than Ide (1989) and Matsumoto (1989) allow for. Similarly, Chen et al. (2013) 
found parallels in the requesting behaviour of Japanese, Chinese and American respondents, 
indicating that while there may be differences at one level, there are some fundamental similarities 
at another level.  
In fact, none of the protagonists of a similar position argue that Eastern and Western politeness are 
identical or deny any culture-specific differences.  For as Leech (2007, 170) maintains, both an 
absolute universalist position as well as a completely relativist position are equally untenable. While 
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the basic operational principles of ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ politeness may be similar, what is needed 
is to tease out the points of difference and the points of commonality without any preconceived 
viewpoints. This new journal offers an excellent opportunity to further this agenda. 
To understand better how this might take place, it is helpful to consider the concepts of emic and 
etic. Very roughly speaking, etics are concepts, behaviours and items that cut across cultural groups 
(i.e. are pan-cultural), while emics are concepts, behaviours and items that are meaningful within a 
community, but are not necessarily shared across other communities (i.e. are culture-specific). 
However, the distinction is more complex than this, as we discuss in the next section. 
3. Emic and etic perspectives 
The terms emic and etic were first coined in the 1950s by the descriptive linguist, Kenneth 
Pike (1967), drawing on the distinction between phonetics and phonemics. They were subsequently 
reinterpreted by the anthropologist Marvin Harris (1964), and since then, as Table 1 illustrates, they 
have been used in a number of different ways by different people. The conceptualisations have been 
highly contested, with one theorist’s interpretation often being challenged by others. 
 
 Emic Etic 
Pike 1967:37 The "emic viewpoint results from studying 
behavior as from inside the system" 
The “etic viewpoint studies behavior as 
from outside of a particular system and as 
an essential initial approach to an alien 
system.” 
Harris, 1976: 
331 
“Operationally, emic refers to the presence of 
an actual or potential interactive context in 
which ethnographer and informant meet and 
carry on a discussion about a particular 
domain. This discussion is deemed productive 
to the extent that the ethnographer discovers 
principles that represent and account for the 
way in which that domain is organized or 
structured in the mental life of that 
informant.”  
“The operational meaning of etics, in 
contrast, is defined by the logically 
nonessential status of actor-observer 
elicitation. Interaction between 
anthropologist and actors is deemed 
productive only to the extent that principles 
of organization or structure that exist 
outside of the minds of the actors have 
been discovered. These principles may in 
fact be contrary to the principles elicitable 
from the actors themselves with respect to 
the manner in which they organize their 
imaginations, concepts, and thoughts in the 
identified domain. 
Willis 2007, 
p.100 
"The emic approach looks at things through 
the eyes of members of the culture being 
studied. What is valid or true is what 
members of the culture agree on." 
“The etic approach uses structures or 
criteria developed outside the culture as a 
framework for studying the culture. […] Etic 
constructs are accounts, descriptions, and 
analyses expressed in terms of the 
conceptual schemes and categories that are 
regarded as meaningful and appropriate by 
the community of scientific observers." 
Yin 2015, 
p.16-17 
"an emic perspective attempts to capture 
participants' indigenous meanings of real-
world events" 
“an etic perspective represents external 
meanings, typically those of the researcher, 
or others outside of the cultures or 
institutions being studied” 
 
Table 1: Differing interpretations of etic and emic 
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As can be seen from Table 1, a number of contrasts can be identified: 
 Cultural participant – scientific observer 
 Insider perspective – outsider perspective 
 Culture-internal orientation – culture-comparative orientation 
 Emergent conceptualisation – pre-existing conceptualisation 
Whatever one’s viewpoints on these contrasts, we would argue as follows: If this journal is to form a 
bridge between “pragmaticians (sic) from East Asian and Western countries”, as it aspires to, a 
culture-comparative orientation will be important. This will require both emic and etic perspectives 
to be included in the research that is undertaken and reported. As J. K. Hall (2002) points out, the 
two need to work hand in hand: 
The real value of this distinction in my opinion is understanding how the etic and emic 
levels can work together to help us learn about our own and other cultures. Compilations 
of emic observations can help create etic frameworks that in turn can be used to discover 
and compare emic differences and similarities across cultures. Thus, emic-level findings 
can help to expand and refine etic knowledge, and etic frameworks can help to discover 
and enlighten emic concepts.  
Hall, 2002, 67 
Within pragmatics, sometimes the interconnections between the concepts of emic/etic and 
first/second order politeness can be confusing, in that both can make reference to the participant 
and the analyst. We therefore  attempt to illustrate their interconnections in Figures 1 and 2 below. 
We follow Harris’ (2001) conceptualisation of emics as including the participants’ unconscious as 
well as conscious conceptualisations and interpretations of behaviour and language use. Moreover, 
we take a research procedure perspective rather than a participant perspective. (For further 
discussion, see Eelen, 2001; Haugh, 2012; Kádár and Haugh, 2013.) 
 
Figure 1: Emic research as the starting point 
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Figure 2: Interplay between Emic and Etic research 
 
In this article, we attempt to outline existing work in other disciplines on etic perspectives on 
culture, as it particularly pertains to (im)politeness evaluations and the moral order, since this has 
frequently been either ignored within politeness theory or dismissed without careful examination. 
Our aim is to stimulate discussion on the foundations to people’s judgements and the ways in which 
culture may affect them.    
4. (Im)politeness evaluations, norms and the moral order 
It is widely accepted now that while it is important to study (im)politeness from a behavioural or 
language use point of view, a vital complementary focus is  the evaluative judgements that people 
make about the behaviour.  As Kádár and Haugh (2013) point out, this entails some kind of 
normative frame of reference. In other words, when we judge a person to be polite or impolite, we 
draw on our conceptions of polite and impolite behaviour in the context concerned, and these 
conceptions in turn are based on our normative anticipations as to what we expect people to do or 
say in that context. Here it is useful to draw a distinction that the social psychologist, Robert Cialdini 
(2012), has made between two types of norms: descriptive norms and injunctive norms.  Descriptive 
norms refer to what is typically done or what is ‘normal’, while injunctive norms refer to what is 
typically approved of or disapproved of by members of a social group. In terms of (im)politeness 
evaluations, it is injunctive norms that are particularly relevant and, as Cialdini points out, they 
constitute the moral rules of the group. Sometimes the two types of norms are congruent and 
sometimes they are not. Of course, norms are only norms. It is important to remember that people 
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do not necessarily follow either type of norms, as a range of individual and contextual factors 
influence how closely people adhere to the norms. 
In exploring (im)politeness evaluations, we need to consider two issues: a) since norms are 
associated with social groups, we need to ask which group’s norms are being drawn on; and b) since 
attributions of politeness or impoliteness are based on evaluations, we need to consider the 
foundation for the judgements.  
In terms of the first issue, Kádár and Haugh (2013) maintain that the norms of all types and sizes of 
groups can act as a frame of reference for (im)politeness judgements, ranging from relatively small, 
closed networks such as families or close friends, through medium-sized groups such as workplace 
employees, to large, rather diffuse groups such as geographical regions or whole countries. They 
propose that the various group norms – the localised norms, the community of 
practice/organisational or other group-based norms, and the societal norms – are reflexively layered 
or nested one within the other. Clearly this brings ‘culture’ centrally into (im)politeness evaluation, 
because the norms of groups can be regarded as a cultural phenomenon, at least for those who 
regard patterns of ‘practices’ as key elements of culture (e.g. see Moran, 2001 and section 5 below).  
Norms give rise to expectancies and injunctive norms appeal to a moral order.  In other words, when 
behaviour or language use is associated with an injunctive norm, it is judged to be good/bad, 
appropriate/inappropriate, impolite/polite, and so on. Moreover, since norms are associated with 
groups, presumably different groups may have different ‘moral orders’ which may coincide or differ 
from broader social norms. Thus Kádár and Haugh (2013) argue as follows:  
Invoking the moral order can also involve explicitly casting participants as either members 
relative to this moral order, and thus insiders, or as non-members, who are inevitably seen as 
taking an outsider perspective on it. Attributing an insider versus outsider perspective on the 
moral order can be highly consequential for how understandings of politeness, impoliteness and 
so on develop in interaction, because what participants can be held accountable for can be 
traced, in part, to perceptions of the moral order and the (perceived) status of participants vis-à-
vis that moral order. 
Kádár and Haugh, 2013,124–5 
But what are the bases on which people make their moral judgements? This is an angle that 
pragmaticists like Kádár and Haugh have rarely addressed (but see  Kádár and Marquez Reiter, 2015, 
for a pragmatics-based attempt in this area), and yet this is of fundamental importance for a theory 
of (im)politeness, especially when considering (im)politeness across cultures. Here researchers 
working in moral psychology and social justice, most notably Jonathan Haidt, can offer some 
interesting insights. Haidt and his colleagues (e.g. Haidt and Graham, 2007; Haidt and Kesebir, 2010; 
Graham, Nosek, Haidt et al., 2011) propose that there are five universal foundations to morality: 
authority/respect, ingroup/loyalty, harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, and purity/sanctity. Table 2 gives 
a brief explanation of each of these categories. 
Moral Foundation Explanation 
Ingroup/loyalty Concerns related to obligations of group membership, such as loyalty, self-
sacrifice, and vigilance against betrayal. 
Authority/respect Concerns related to social order and the obligations of hierarchical 
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relationships, such obedience, respect, and the fulfilment of role-based 
duties. 
Harm/care Concerns for the suffering of others, including virtues of caring and 
compassion. 
Fairness/reciprocity Concerns about unfair treatment, cheating, and more abstract notions of 
justice and rights. 
Purity/sanctity Concerns about physical and spiritual contagion, including virtues of 
chastity, wholesomeness, and control of desires. 
Table 2: Moral foundations according to Haidt (from Haidt and Kesebir, 2010, 822) 
The first two moral foundations are concerned with relational links: group membership and 
hierarchical relations. The third and fourth moral foundations are concerned with our treatment of 
others. The fifth moral foundation is concerned with our personal morality. In a sense then, the 
moral foundations components are predominantly relational. Despite the differences from 
frameworks used within politeness theory, there are obvious synergies in certain elements, such as 
issues of power (Authority/respect), cost/benefit and reciprocity (Fairness/reciprocity).  In fact, 
though, each is relevant to evaluations of (im)politeness and rapport, and each could underpin a 
group’s injunctive norms. This is even valid for purity/sanctity, which could play a key role in explicit 
moral evaluations, in the course of which people metapragmatically evoke morality and/or its lack.  
Haidt and Graham (2007) point out that cultural groups can vary in the extent to which they 
emphasise (i.e. construct, value and teach) each of these moral foundations, such that some of the 
foundations are more important within some social groups than others. In line with this, Haidt and 
Kesebir (2010) report that political liberals and political conservatives in the USA hold different 
viewpoints with regard to the various moral foundations.  In other words, Haidt and his colleagues 
regard these five elements of the moral domain as universally available (i.e. they offer an etic 
framework) but are variably developed and manifested among different cultural groups (i.e. they 
have emic manifestations). 
Interestingly, even though Kádár and Haugh (2013) link the moral order closely to sociocultural 
groups or relational networks, and even though they devote a whole chapter to discussing culture 
and politeness, they do not explore the potential interconnections between culture and the moral 
order (although Kádár ventures into this theme, to some extent, in his 2013 monograph dedicated to 
rituals).  For instance, what underlying values and beliefs influence people’s moral order judgements 
and thus what similarities and/or differences might there be in the instantiation of the moral order 
across different contexts and different cultural groups? It is essential for us to explore questions 
such as these if we are to deepen our understanding of what the moral order entails and how 
cultural factors may affect it. First, though, we need to explore some key questions about culture. 
5. Key questions about culture  
There are numerous definitions of culture, with little consensus among the wide range of definitions 
that have been proposed (Apte, 1994). In this paper, we roughly follow Spencer-Oatey’s (2008) 
definition: 
Culture is a fuzzy set of basic assumptions and values, orientations to life, beliefs, policies, 
procedures and behavioural conventions that are shared by a group of people, and that 
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influence (but do not determine) each member’s behaviour and his/her interpretations of 
the ‘meaning’ of other people’s behaviour. 
Spencer-Oatey 2008, 3 
This definition raises two fundamental questions:  
a. Where does culture ‘reside’ – in individuals, and/or in groups, and in what kinds of groups?  
b. What are the different ways in which culture can be manifested in those individuals and/or 
groups?  
In cross-cultural pragmatics, as Eelen (2001) points out, researchers have frequently equated 
cultural group with language group (e.g. Gu, 1990; Olshtain, 1989) or with nation (e.g. Blum-Kulka et 
al., 1989; Watts,1989) and sometimes they have associated it with ethnic group (Nwoye, 1992). In 
empirical studies, especially in 1980s and 1990s, it was rarely questioned which type of cultural 
group was being studied. More recently, though, it has become a much more contentious issue, not 
least because of the risk of stereotyping and essentialising members of the larger groups. There has 
been a move towards studying smaller groups, such as workplace teams, but as Holmes, Marra, and 
Vine (2011) explain, as well as Kádár and Haugh (2013), the cultures of these smaller groups are 
nested within larger groups, such as organisations and the broader society. Thus, as Chao and Moon 
(2005) point out, “An individual’s unique collage of multiple cultural identities yields a complex 
picture of the cultural influences on that person” (p.1128). They refer to this as a cultural mosaic, 
with people’s cultural identities comprising numerous ‘cultural tiles’. Within each individual, their 
‘tiles’ exert different degrees of influence in different contexts in dynamic and complex ways and in 
interaction with their personality and other aspects of their individual characteristics.  
As a result of this complexity, and since members of these cultural groups are not homogeneous in 
their display of cultural patterns or norms, a fundamental issue with regard to cultural groups, and 
especially for large groups, is the difficulty of establishing cultural boundaries. Here, an analogy 
drawn by Žegarac (2007) between culture and epidemics can be helpful. He points out that just as 
epidemics entail diseased individuals, so cultures must have representations in the brains/minds of 
individuals. Yet when an epidemic spreads, the interaction between people and the environment 
means that individuals are afflicted to varying degrees, with some individuals maybe escaping 
completely. This variation among individuals does not stop medical experts from classifying an 
outbreak as epidemic; the key is the proportion of the population who are affected. The same is true 
for cultural groups. There is no need to require homogeneity among all members in their 
behavioural norms or patterns in order for them to be classified as a cultural group. However, there 
does need to be a certain degree of shared patterning or norms across the members. 
So this brings us to the next question: what are the patterns that are shared? Pragmaticists have 
usually just focused on the linguistic/behavioural features they are interested in researching, such as 
apology strategies or small talk. However, from a conceptual point of view we can dig deeper than 
this. Moran (2001), drawing on the world-readiness standards for learning languages drawn up by 
the American Council on the teaching of foreign languages (ACTFL, nd), distinguishes three ‘levels’ of 
culture: products, practices and perspectives, which we paraphrase in Table 3. 
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Products  These are the ‘concrete’ or ‘codified’ aspects of culture. They include physical 
objects such as buildings, clothes, furniture, equipment, and how they are arranged 
(e.g. interior design of a room). They also include less tangible aspects, such as the 
language code – the words, sounds and grammar of a language. 
Practices  These are the regularities of behaviour that we display, such as driving on the left 
side of the road, and shaking hands or bowing when we meet someone new. They 
include our common patterns of speaking – the ways in which we use the words, 
sounds and grammar of our language, such as how we typically introduce people or 
engage in small talk. These practices reflect the rules, conventions and norms of the 
social group in which we are interacting. 
Perspectives  These are the deep-seated and often unconscious attitudes, values and beliefs that 
we hold about life, such as respect for elders, the need for modesty, and the 
importance of independence and self-sufficiency. 
Table 3: Levels of Cultural Patterns 
Products and practices are the visible or directly observable components of culture, while 
perspectives are hidden and need to be inferred, as indicated by the widely-used metaphor of the 
iceberg (E. T. Hall, 1976). 
In this paper, we focus on the perspectives (i.e. the deeper aspects of culture) that people draw on 
when making their (im)politeness evaluations and that are therefore a key source of the moral 
order. So in the next section we explore the interconnections between the deep roots of culture, the 
moral order, and (im)politeness evaluations of behaviour and language use.  
6. The deep roots of culture: moral foundations and basic values   
Academics from a range of disciplines have devoted a great deal of research attention to the 
‘hidden’ aspects of culture. Traditionally the focus has been on fundamental assumptions and basic 
values, with key work in this area being carried out by anthropologists (e.g. Kluckhohn and 
Strodtbeck (1961), psychologists (e.g. Schwartz 1992; Schwartz et al. 2012), and organisational 
behaviour/management scholars (e.g. Hofstede 1980/2001; House et al. 2004).  More recently, 
there has been an increased interest in culture as beliefs. Some large scale studies have explored 
social axioms across cultures (e.g. Leung et al. 2002; Bond et al. 2004), and there have been calls for 
more work on culture and religious beliefs (e.g. Tarakeshwar et al. 2003; Saucier et al. 2015).  
In this section, we explore (im)politeness evaluations and the moral order, using Haidt’s (Haidt and 
Graham, 2007; Haidt and Kesebir, 2010; Graham, Nosek, Haidt et al., 2011) moral foundations 
framework as the organising principle. We inter-relate concepts in politeness theory with this 
approach and consider whether basic values can yield further insights into the sources of moral 
evaluations (cf. Boer & Fischer, 2013). We present some authentic (im)politeness-related 
encounters/incidents that involve Chinese and non-Chinese participants to help illustrate our 
arguments. 
6.1 The moral order of relational links: Perspectives on groups 
Participant relations within pragmatics, as well as within politeness theory, have traditionally been 
conceptualised in terms of power and distance, perhaps because of the focus on dyadic interaction. 
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In terms of relational links, B&L (1978/1987) gave central place to the individual’s rights to personal 
preserves, freedom of action and freedom from imposition, through their concept of negative 
politeness. Yet as explained in section 2, pragmaticists such as Matsumoto (1988) and Ide (1989), 
challenged this viewpoint, arguing that in Japanese society, the key issue is not individual freedom 
but ‘occupying the proper place’ in society. Matsumoto (1988, 407) quotes the anthropologist Lebra 
to explain this: 
By proper-place occupancy I mean one’s awareness of the place assigned to one in a 
social group, institution, or society as a whole; one’s capacity and willingness to fulfil all 
obligations attached to that place; and one’s claim to recognition of that place by others. 
Lebra, 1976, 67; cited by Matsumoto, 1988, 407 
This is a perspective taken up subsequently by Haugh (2005, 2007).  
Ide (1989) maintains that the sense of proper place is determined by B&L’s (1978/1987) weightiness 
variables, power (P), distance (D) and rank (R). We would argue that this is only part of the picture. 
More fundamentally, it relates to people’s underlying perspectives on the interrelationship between 
individuals and groups. This is an aspect that has rarely been explored in depth in pragmatics, and 
yet has frequently emerged as a variable in social psychological and anthropological research. 
The anthropologists Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) argued that people throughout the world all 
face a number of core human issues that they need to resolve, and that there are limited core 
solutions to these problems. The five core problems that they identified, along with the main 
possible solutions, are shown in Table 4 (see Hills, 2002, for a helpful account). 
Core Issue Possible Solutions 
Primary orientation 
to time 
Focus on the Past 
(emphasis on 
maintaining traditions)  
Focus on the Present 
(emphasis on achieving 
best solution for current 
situation) 
Focus on the Future 
(emphasis on planning ahead) 
Relationship to the 
environment 
Subjugation to nature 
(belief that humans 
should submit to higher 
forces & not try to 
control them) 
Harmony with nature 
(belief that humans 
should control what they 
can but also live in 
harmony with nature) 
Mastery over nature 
(belief that humans can and 
should control the forces of 
nature) 
Quality of human 
nature 
Basically evil Mixture of good and bad Basically good 
Relationship 
among people 
Lineal  
(preference for 
hierarchical relations) 
Collateral  
(emphasis on consensus 
within extended group) 
Individualistic 
(emphasis on the individual or 
individual families within the 
group who make decisions 
independently from others) 
Mode of human 
activity 
Being 
(acceptance of the status 
quo) 
Being-in-becoming 
(preference for 
transformation) 
Doing 
(preference for direct 
intervention) 
Table 4: Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck’s (1961) Cultural orientation framework 
Here we can see that ‘relationship among people’ is identified as one of the fundamental issues that 
every social group needs to handle and that the issue of group vis-à-vis the individual is a key one. 
This relates to one of the most frequently mentioned dimensions in cross-cultural psychology, 
individualism–collectivism (e.g. Hofstede, 2001; Triandis, 1995). Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier 
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(2002) identify the core characteristic of individualism as individuals functioning independently of 
each other, and the core characteristic of collectivism as group members being bound and mutually 
obligated to each other.  Although there is now a lot of debate about the details of the construct of 
individualism–collectivism (e.g. Fiske 2002; Miller, 2002), the variability it tries to account for is of 
fundamental relevance to politeness theory and the moral order. It addresses issues such as how 
independent people generally like to be in their actions, how obligated they feel towards the needs 
of others, and who are encompassed in those mutual obligations.        
One feature of relational links that is often associated with individualism–collectivism is the 
distinction between in-groups and out-groups, and the extent to which people distinguish sharply 
between these groups. Again, this is an important issue for (im)politeness evaluations, as Kádár and 
Haugh (2013) explain: 
Attributing an insider versus outsider perspective on the moral order can be highly 
consequential for how understandings of politeness, impoliteness and so on develop in 
interaction, because what participants can be held accountable for can be traced, in part, 
to perceptions of the moral order and the (perceived) status of participants vis-à-vis that 
moral order. 
Kádár and Haugh, 2013, 124–5 
Here work by the psychologist, Shalom Schwartz, is of relevance as he has developed one of the 
most rigorous and increasingly influential value-based frameworks of recent years. We introduce his 
model here not only because it includes values pertinent to in-groups and out-groups, but also 
because it depicts other values that are relevant to the moral order underpinning (im)politeness 
evaluations and which we will refer to in subsequent sections. 
Schwartz defines basic values as “trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding 
principles in the life of a person or a group” (Schwartz et al., 2012, 664). He maintains that the values 
he proposes are likely to be universal because they are grounded in one or more of three universal 
requirements of human existence: human needs as individual biological organisms; human needs for 
coordinated social action; and the needs of groups for survival and welfare. His framework is 
particularly valuable in that it is one of the few that can be applied at the individual level. Moreover, 
one of its unique features is that the values he proposes are represented not as a set of discretely 
different ones but rather as a circular continuum of related motivations, as shown in Figure 3. An 
analogy with colours may help explain this: just as one colour merges into another, so one value 
gradually shifts to another.  
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Fig.3: Schwartz’s circular motivational continuum of 19 individual-level values  
(Based on Schwartz et al. 2012) 
In an interesting study, Schwartz (2007) investigated how people’s basic values relate to the 
“inclusiveness of their moral universe”.  He found that individuals both within a given society, as well 
as across different societies, show considerable variation in the breadth and inclusiveness of their 
moral universes. A broad moral inclusiveness is associated with the value universalism, and a narrow 
one with benevolence. He then found that this variation was also associated with people’s attitudes 
towards immigration: the broader their inclusiveness, the more positive their attitudes were.   
These differences in the scope of people’s moral universe are then likely to impact significantly on 
their (im)politeness evaluations. A personal example from the first author illustrates this point. 
Example 1 
This incident took place in the 1980s, when Helen was working in Shanghai. It was a time 
when many goods were in short supply. One Saturday morning Helen went to a local store 
to buy some yoghurt and some milk. There were two long queues for each of these items 
and she joined the queue for yoghurt. As she gradually waited her turn, she began to realise 
that by the time she had bought her yoghurt and lined up again for milk, the milk would all 
have been sold out. As it came almost to her turn to buy her yoghurt, she noticed that one 
person ahead of her had bought both yoghurt and milk – the assistant had simply reached 
over for a bottle of milk. So when Helen was served, she also asked for a bottle of milk in 
addition to the yoghurt.  Immediately the assistant shouted at her, clearly unwilling to sell 
her the milk. Others in the queue started shouting back and there was a great commotion. 
Eventually the assistant reached for a bottle of milk and sold Helen both the yoghurt and 
the milk. However, when she was about to give Helen her change, she looked at Helen in 
disgust and then deliberately threw her change on the floor. 
Helen was extremely taken aback by the incident but through reflection and discussion with 
others realised the source of the problem. The other customer who had bought both 
yoghurt and milk was a friend of the shop assistant and everyone else in the queue realised 
that the assistant had allowed this because of ‘in-group relations’.  When Helen asked for 
both items, the shop assistant scolded her because as an outsider, she was not entitled to 
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this special treatment. Other people in the queue were aware of this and so no one else 
asked for both items. However, when the assistant shouted at Helen, these other people 
jumped to Helen’s defence, arguing that the assistant should also give Helen preferential 
treatment, because of the Chinese custom of being hospitable to foreign visitors. The 
assistant eventually agreed to do so, but threw Helen’s change on the floor to convey her 
annoyance and reluctance at having to do so.  
From this incident, we can see clearly the impact of in-group/out-group relational links on 
polite and impolite behaviour. Helen did not expect the in-group/out-group distinction to 
influence customer service in a shop, yet both the shop assistant and the people in the queue 
clearly did so (despite their interpreting the scope somewhat differently). This led to differing 
evaluative judgements by all three: Helen, the shop assistant and the members of the queue.   
At a cultural group level, many would argue that even though connections (guanxi) are 
important in all societies, they are particularly salient in China and more broadly in East Asia. It 
seems that the gap between in-group (nei, known in Japanese as uchi) and out-group (wai, 
soto in Japanese) is traditionally large in East Asia in comparison with many other societies, 
and that the interactional rules of appropriate behaviour differ for ‘in- group’ and ‘out-group’ 
members (see Pan, 2000). In other words, in Haidt’s terms (Haidt and Graham, 2007; Haidt and 
Kesebir, 2010), there are differences in the societies’ ingroup/loyalty moral foundations. 
6.2 The moral order of relational links: Perspectives on hierarchy 
The power relations of participants are an important element of pragmatic theory and central to 
most (im)politeness models, including those of B&L (1978/1987), Leech (1983, 2014), and Spencer-
Oatey (2008). B&L point out that the prevalence of status differentiation or of egalitarianism can 
vary across societies, and research by Spencer-Oatey (1997) reports cross-cultural differences in this 
respect with regard to one type of role relationship. However, there has been little or no work 
within pragmatics to explore the moral order underpinning such tendencies. This is in contrast to 
research by anthropologists and psychologists who have studied this issue extensively. 
As shown in Table 4 above, Kluckhohn and Strotbeck (1961) identified the establishment of 
hierarchical relations is one way of dealing with the fundamental issue of ‘relationship among 
people’. Extensive research has been carried out by social and organisational psychologists into 
people’s basic values and people’s attitude to hierarchy (equality/inequality) has repeatedly 
emerged as an issue of difference. For example, Hofstede (2001), House et al. (2004) and Schwartz 
(e.g. 1992; with Bardi, 2001) all identify power (variously labelled as power distance or simply 
power) as a fundamental dimension of value variation across both individuals and societies. House 
et al. (2004, 30) define the construct as follows: “Power distance: the degree to which members of a 
collective expect power to be distributed equally.” 
Clearly, if individuals, or groups of individuals, hold power distance values such as this, they may 
evaluate behaviour that challenges or fails to uphold their preferences as being impolite or 
inappropriate. The following example from Pan and Kádár (2011,108–109) illustrates how differing 
beliefs about hierarchical relations can affect perceptions of politeness and appropriateness.  
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Example 2: Hierarchical relations 
The U.S. Census Bureau were planning an important national survey and needed to send 
out a letter in advance to tell people about the upcoming survey and to encourage them to 
participate. This letter needed to be sent out in different languages and so the Bureau 
commissioned a study to check the accuracy and cultural appropriateness of the wordings 
of the translated letters. One of the translated languages was Chinese and twenty-four 
recent Chinese immigrants, who varied in age, educational level, gender, and length of stay 
in the U.S.A., were selected to participate in the study. In an interview setting they were 
asked to comment on and evaluate the translation of the letter to see if it was clear and 
easy to understand. They were also asked to comment on the cultural appropriateness of 
the terms and expressions used, including levels of politeness. The letter was signed by the 
U.S. Census Bureau director.  
The first paragraph of the letter stated: 
Dear Resident: 
The U.S. Census Bureau is conducting the American Community Survey. A Census 
Bureau representative will contact you to help you complete the survey.  I would 
appreciate your help, because the success of this survey depends on you. 
This beginning paragraph was translated into Chinese as follows:  
尊敬的居民： 
美國人口普查局正在進行一項「美國社區调查」。一位人口普查局的服務代表會
與您聯繫，幫助您填寫該調查問卷。我們非常感謝您的幫助，因為本項調查的成
功取決於您的支持。 
 
The Chinese translation of this paragraph contains several linguistic politeness features: the 
use of an honorific term zunjing de 尊敬的 (‘honourable’) in the salutation, the use of the 
formal and polite second person pronoun nin 您, an expression of appreciation (women 
feichang ganxie nin de bangzhu 我們非常感謝您的幫助, ‘We are extremely grateful to you 
for your help’), and dependence on the other (yinwei ben xiang diaocha de chenggong 
qujue yu nin de zhichi 因為本項調查的成功取決於您的支持, ‘because the success of this 
survey depends on your support’).  
The Chinese speakers’ interview comments on the wording of this first paragraph are very 
revealing in terms of perception of politeness.  They stated that the letter was written in 
too polite a tone and sounded unnatural in Chinese. They commented that the director of a 
government agency would not normally thank the people, or show open appreciation. 
Some of them even laughed when they read this paragraph and said that U.S. government 
was ‘too polite’. In other words, they thought the Census Bureau Director had the authority 
to be more directive and should have worded the letter in that way. Yet if the English 
version of the letter had been more directive, instructing the American recipients to 
participate in the survey, this would almost certainly have been regarded as disrespectful 
and impolite by the English-speaking Americans.  
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This example, therefore, illustrates how differing beliefs about normative hierarchical relations and 
about the rights of those holding institutional power to give instructions to the general public, can 
influence perceptions of (im)politeness.  
6.3. The moral order of relational conduct: Perspectives on care and consideration 
B&L (1978/1987) argue that it is usually in people’s best interests to maintain the face of others, 
because if they do not, others may threaten their face in return.  Some scholars (e.g. Schmidt 1980), 
however, have commented that this is an overly pessimistic and paranoid view of human social 
interaction, and others have criticised it for its strategic rationalism. Intachakra (2012), for example, 
maintains that Lakoff (1973), Leech (1983) and B&L (1978/1987) all assume a ‘means-to-end’ 
rationality, but fail to account adequately for a very different approach – a ‘rapport-oriented’ 
rationality. He expounds the Thai emic concept of KKJ, which can be very roughly translated as 
‘heart/mind’, and explains that it entails being considerate to others, being aware of their feelings 
and desires, and being concerned for their peace of mind. So in his view, a theory of politeness 
needs to incorporate a ‘caring for others’ perspective.  
This resonates with the moral foundation that Haidt and his colleagues (e.g. Haidt and Graham, 
2007; Haidt and Kesebir, 2010; Graham, Nosek, Haidt et al., 2011) label as ‘harm/care’. This type of 
morality entails concern for the suffering of others, including the virtues of caring and compassion. 
Such an orientation is closely associated once again with Schwartz’s basic values of ‘benevolence – 
caring’ and ‘universalism – concern’, which he probes with the following questionnaire items 
(Schwartz et al. 2012, 688, male version): 
Benevolence – caring: 
 It’s very important to him to help the people dear to him. 
 Caring for the well-being of people he is close to is important to him.  
 He tries always to be responsive to the needs of his family and friends. 
Universalism – concern: 
 Protecting society’s weak and vulnerable members is important to him. 
 He thinks it is important that every person in the world have equal opportunities in life.  
 He wants everyone to be treated justly, even people he doesn’t know. 
So it seems feasible that people and/or societies who attach great importance to these values of 
care will be more likely to display a ‘rapport-oriented’ rationality than those who attach less 
importance to them. However, as discussed in section 6.1, the range of people who are 
encompassed in such displays of care can vary, depending on whether they hold strong values for 
both benevolence and universalism or whether they hold strong values only for benevolence. 
A cultural group’s emphasis on benevolence and/or universalism is often reflected in metadiscourse 
comments on appropriate behaviour. There has been a national level debate on this in China in 
recent years, following a now infamous case in 2011 in which 18 people failed to help a young 
toddler who had been run over by a car and was lying seriously injured in the street. The concerns 
led to the country’s first “Good Samaritan law” coming into effect in Shenzhen in August 2013, which 
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demonstrated a fresh effort by the government to change public attitudes towards helping others.1 
It seems that individuals in all societies typically feel a responsibility to help members of their in-
group, but the extent to which they demonstrate care and consideration for ‘outsiders’ can vary 
significantly according to their moral foundations. This is supported by two metapragmatic studies 
conducted by Kádár and Márquez-Reiter (2015) and Ran and Kádár (forthcoming) on ‘bystander 
intervention’.  
6.4 The moral order of relational conduct: Perspectives on fairness 
Several politeness models incorporate the notion of fairness but do so rather implicitly. For example, 
B&L (1978/1987) propose the concept of weightiness, including the concept of rank (R) or degree of 
imposition, while Leech (1983) refers to a cost/benefit scale. Spencer-Oatey (2008), on the other 
hand, mentions it more explicitly, proposing equity as a sociopragmatic interactional principle. She 
defines this as a fundamental belief that people are entitled to consideration from others, and she 
suggests it has two components. The first is cost/benefit – the principle of keeping costs and benefits 
roughly in balance through the principle of reciprocity – and the second is autonomy/imposition – 
the principle of keeping levels of imposition and autonomy roughly in balance, again through the 
principle of reciprocity.  
This is not an aspect of politeness theory that many people have discussed in depth, and is also not a 
clear element of Schwartz’s basic values. It could be argued that the values of ‘benevolence – caring’ 
and ‘universalism’ are essential for the fair treatment of others, but they do not incorporate the 
notion of reciprocity. An example from Xing (2002) can help illustrate the importance of this moral 
foundation for assessments of (im)politeness. 
Example 3 
A British engineering company had sold equipment to China and afterwards hosted a 10-
day delegation visit from the customers.  The costs of hosting the visit were included in the 
sales price and a tradition had arisen that any money remaining in the budget at the end of 
a visit would be given to the visitors as personal ‘pocket money’. However, this particular 
trip was fraught with problems throughout. The delegation was dissatisfied with the initial 
welcome meeting, cancelled all the training sessions and insisted on 10 days of sightseeing. 
On the final day, when they were each handed their ‘pocket money’ in an envelope, they 
opened the envelopes in front of their hosts, counted the money and then argued that it 
was not enough. They insisted on seeing an itemised list of the host company’s costs for the 
visit and argued for two hours over specific details.  
The British manager responsible for the practicalities of the visit was extremely annoyed 
and commented afterwards as follows: “off the record, they haven’t any ethics, you know 
they had no due respect for their hosts.” The Chinese visitors, on the other hand, believed 
they were being cheated over the amount of ‘pocket money’ they were due and that they 
therefore had the right to insist on it being recalculated. One forcefully commented as 
follows to the interpreter: 
                                                          
1
 http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1293475/shenzhen-introduces-good-samaritan-law 
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你让他去听听。中国人就这么好欺负，好糊弄啊? 本来这就是我们伙食里节约下来的
钱。我们整天在家里吃方便面，节约下来的被他们捞跑了,这像话吗?  
You just tell him. Is it so easy to bully us Chinese, so easy to fool us? This money is what we 
have been saving out of our mouths. We’ve been eating instant noodles every day just to 
save some money and now they have grabbed it. How unreasonable is that?   
One of the delegation members, though, was conscious of the negative impression their 
challenges might convey and listed the different relational-management issues they needed 
to consider: 
一个是不要让人说我们小气，再一个不要显得我们太无能，再一个我们要友好一点。
One thing is that we shouldn’t leave people saying that we are stingy, second, we shouldn’t 
give the impression of being too weak, but in addition we should be a bit friendlier.     
Here we can see clearly that people’s interpretations of fairness and reciprocity influenced 
participants’ sense of rights to negotiate/argue as well as their evaluations of the 
(im)politeness/appropriateness of such behaviour. Interestingly, it seems that both British and 
Chinese upheld the same moral foundation of fairness/reciprocity, yet held differing views as to what 
actually counted as fair.  This raises a fundamental question that we return to in section 7.3: what 
kinds of association there are between values, (im)politeness evaluations and behaviour and what 
other factors or underlying perspectives may play a role. 
6.5 The moral order of personal conduct: Perspectives on wholesomeness 
B&L (1978/1987) identify face as the key feature of their model of politeness, with ‘positive face’ as 
a particularly important element. They define positive face as “the positive consistent self-image … 
claimed by interactants” (p.61), and the desire that others appreciate and approve of those self-
images. One of Mao’s (1994) criticisms of B&L’s concept of face is that it fails to capture the Chinese 
concepts of face, as reflected in the terms liăn and miànzi. He explains these two Chinese 
conceptions of face as follows: miànzi stands for prestige or reputation, while liăn refers to a good 
moral reputation. The latter thus seems closely associated with the Haidt’s moral foundation of 
purity/sanctity. 
An example from Hinze (2012, 22) illustrates this.  
Example 4 
A non-Chinese construction company wanted to make some adjustments to a contract with 
a Chinese company, claiming that the current specifications had only been discussed with 
the Chinese party’s technical personnel, not with their commercial personnel. The Chinese 
party disputed this claim and maintained that all relevant parties had been involved. A 
junior Chinese negotiator suggested they might compromise, but a more senior negotiator 
refused to do so, arguing his case on moral uprightness grounds: 
不,我们不准备作出任何让步。他们在规格上撒谎。如果他们自己不要脸，那我们就
不用给他们留脸面。 
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No. We are not going to offer any concessions. They are lying about the specifications – if 
they don’t want liăn, we should not give them liănmiàn. 
Here we see that the senior Chinese negotiator treated lying as a loss of liăn (moral face), and this is 
clearly related to Haidt’s moral foundation of purity/sanctity 
What values then may underpin this moral foundation? In fact, a number of the basic values 
identified by Schwartz (Schwartz et al., 2012) could be subject to impoliteness evaluations if 
wholesomeness is breached or impropriety is displayed in excess. In Example 4, the concern was a 
breach of honesty. On other occasions, different values might be threatened. For example, in June 
2015 a group of young Westerners were arrested by the Malaysian authorities for posing naked and 
urinating on a sacred mountain, Mount Kinabalu. Local village people believe that the souls of the 
dead rest in this mountain and so for them this was a major insult, showing great lack of respect for 
their traditions.2 The young people’s behaviour was thus judged to be offensive because of lack of 
purity/sanctity, and in Schwartz’s terms, the moral basis to this evaluation was breach of the value 
‘tradition’, which Schwartz defines in terms of maintenance of traditional customs, values or beliefs.  
7. Discussion 
7.1 The East-West debate revisited 
Having explored (im)politeness in relation to Haidt’s five moral foundations, we now consider 
whether we can gain any new insights into the East-West debate.  
Firstly, we can see that Japanese (im)politeness (as argued by Ide, 1989; Matsumoto, 1989; Haugh, 
2005) is closely associated with two of Haidt’s moral foundations: in-group/loyalty and 
authority/respect. These seem to be particularly important in Japanese society and seem to underlie 
Japanese concerns for wakimae (‘discernment’) and for ‘place’. They are of comparatively lesser 
importance in English-speaking societies, such as the UK and the USA, and this can partly explain 
why East and West politeness can operate differently.  
Secondly, these two moral foundations (in-group/loyalty and authority/respect) also underpin 
Chinese and Japanese concepts of face in that, as Mao (1994) argues, face in both Chinese and 
Japanese has a strong public, communal aspect. For instance, Mao explains face in Japanese as 
follows: 
After being introduced to someone, the speaker may say the following, or some variation of 
it: “Dooza yorosiku onegaisimasu”, which is literally translated as “I ask you to please treat 
me well/take care of me” (Matsumoto, 1988: 409). In uttering this sentence, the speaker is 
implicitly making a direct request or an unveiled imposition. Yet, the speaker is not trying to 
mitigate the imposition that such a direct request usually entails by way of the politeness 
marker ‘please’; nor is the speaker stroking the partner’s positive face by showing some 
sign of intimacy. Rather, the speaker is expressing deference by humbling him- or herself 
and placing him- or herself in a lower position (Matsumoto, 1988: 409-410). Deferent 
imposition, Matsumoto explains, “enhance[s] the good self-image (that is, the ‘face’) of the 
                                                          
2
 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/11/mount-kinabalu-naked-prank-eleanor-hawkins 
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addressee” since “the acknowledgement of interdependence is encouraged” in Japanese 
society (1988: 410). To the extent that speakers are successful in achieving the goal of 
acknowledging the current interdependent relationship, they enhance the partner’s face as 
well as their own. 
Mao, 1994, 467 
Again, this contrasts strongly with concepts of face in English-speaking societies, which are much 
more individually (or sometimes group) focused, and with much less emphasis on relational face. 
Thirdly, the Chinese face concept of liăn, as depicted by Mao (1994), is closely associated with the 
moral foundation of purity/sanctity. Chinese people’s liăn face is tied to a good moral reputation and 
if anything happens to undermine this reputation, that person (and close associates) will lose face. 
Of course, this is also true to some extent in Western societies, but people would not immediately 
label any such reputation damage as a loss of face.  
Fourthly, Intachakra (2012) argues that Thai politeness is strongly influenced by the ‘heart’. He 
introduces an aspect of Thai politeness called khwa:mkre:ŋtɕ aj (KKJ)which he explains as giving 
central place to the metaphor of the heart, with symbolic value accorded to ‘feelings’, ‘states of 
mind’ and ‘emotions’. He argues that KKJ makes explicit reference to a speaker’s concern for the 
feelings, peace of mind, convenience and/or benefit of others, in contrast with mainstream 
politeness theorisation in which the focus is on the speaker attending to the other person’s image, 
sense of worth and/or reputation. Intachakra further maintains that Thai people aim not so much to 
avoid face-threatening acts, which challenge someone’s personal image, sense of worth and/or 
reputation, but rather to avoid ‘heart-threatening’ acts which may damage people’s feelings. He 
proposes that while it would be premature to argue that KKJ is a universal phenomenon, it “may be 
known under a separate terminological guise or given a higher or lower priority in their respective 
systems of politeness.”(p.632) This claim fits well with our thesis, as KKJ seems to be underpinned by 
the moral foundation of harm/care. In Haidt’s framework, this is a universal moral foundation, but 
its relative importance probably varies across cultural groups. 
We would argue, therefore, that Haidt’s etic framework of moral foundations can help us make 
sense of the different foci and emphases of (im)politeness concerns in different languages and 
cultures. 
7.2 Moral foundations and deep roots of culture: beliefs and ideologies  
In section 6, we considered the extent to which Haidt’s moral foundations can be related to people’s 
underlying basic values, such as those specified by Schwartz (1992; Schwartz et al. 2012). Two of his 
values, notably universalism and benevolence, seem to be particularly influential in affecting in-
group/out-group attitudes, which in turn seem to affect moral order evaluations associated with 
care/consideration and with fairness. However, the relevance of other basic values is less clear. For 
example, while Schwartz includes power in his framework, it is focused on an individual’s personal 
desire for power and status, rather than the more relational concept of power distance (Hofstede, 
2001; House et al., 2004). So might there be other, deep culture perspectives that throw 
further/greater light on (im)politeness evaluations and moral foundations? 
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During the last 10-15 years, a number of cross-cultural psychologists have turned their attention to 
aspects of deep culture other than values. For example, a number of cross-cultural psychologists 
(e.g. Leung et al., 2002; Bond et al., 2004) have been exploring social axioms. However, they concern 
‘how the world works’ rather than evaluative judgements (Leung et al. 2002) and do not seem 
particularly illuminating. Another possibility of particular relevance to issues of moral order is 
religious beliefs.  
Saucier et al. (2015), on the basis of their findings from a large scale study, have recently argued that 
more research needs to be carried out into religious beliefs. These researchers conducted a ‘survey 
of world views’, collecting data from nearly 9000 respondents in 33 countries and incorporated 
measures of a very wide range of variables, including values, social axioms, and religious beliefs and 
practices. They found that some of largest variations across nations in effect size were for religious 
beliefs and practices, and so they recommend that it would be particularly helpful for future studies 
to “focus on beliefs connected to religion (or the metaphysical), and especially on practices and 
behaviors that reflect the everyday impact of religion on persons” (p.63). 
Nearly all (if not all) religions and ideological systems comprise not only beliefs about god and 
human nature, but also include prescriptions about how people should behave. Saroglou (2011) 
proposes an etic framework for considering the interconnections between culture and religion, 
arguing that the following four religious dimensions are universally present across contexts: 
believing, belonging, bonding and behaving. All four of these aspects have clear connections with 
Haidt’s moral foundations. Here we illustrate this with two of Haidt’s moral foundations, care and 
fairness/reciprocity. 
With respect to Christianity, there are repeated admonitions in the Bible, in both the Old Testament 
and the New, to treat other people with care, fairness and justice. Interestingly, however, in the New 
Testament it does not include reciprocity. Jesus teaches that while people should treat others with 
kindness and justice, they should not seek to gain anything in return. Nor should they reciprocate 
any lack of care by others.  For instance in his famous Sermon on the Mount he taught as follows: 
You have heard that it was said, “Eye for eye, and tooth for tooth.” But I tell you, Do not 
resist an evil person. If someone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also. 
And if someone wants to sue you and take your tunic, let him have your cloak as well.  […] 
Love your enemies, do good to them, and lend to them without expecting to get anything 
back. 
The Bible: Matthew, 5, 38–40; Luke 6, 35 
It is worth noting that this sense of unconditional kindness and justice is relatively unique to 
Christianity: although it is present to some extent in some other religions (e.g. Buddhism), it is 
completely alien, for example, to traditional Chinese culture. Due to the Confucian notion of xiào 
(‘respecting parents/elder’), in Chinese morality one must take revenge if one’s parents/older 
relatives/family/group are hurt by someone else, and it is a complete loss of face (liăn – i.e. 
someone’s ‘moral face’) if no revenge attempt is made. In his impressive monograph, Madsen (1984) 
describes the way in which revenge – up to the present day – is being integrated into moral 
(meta)discourses in rural China. 
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It is pertinent to emphasise two points here. Firstly, ‘religion’ is not necessarily limited to religious 
belief (Bellah, 1991): although many societies, following historical changes, claim to be ‘secular’, it is 
often the case that religious concepts continue to influence people’s behaviour irrespective of the 
fact that people may regard themselves as non-believers. A recent study by Kádár and De La Cruz 
(2016) has addressed this issue by exploring the role of acting as a ‘good Samaritan’, and evaluations 
triggered by failing to act in this role, in the highly secular North American society.  This links with 
the second point: even if people do not display such behaviour, they may still make (im)politeness 
evaluations in accordance with them. 
Religious beliefs, such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam, can be regarded more broadly as 
ideologies. So another direction for exploring deep culture perspectives associated with moral 
foundations and (im)politeness would be to examine salient evaluative attitudes in a given ideology 
towards certain types of interpersonal relationship; for example, the relationship between strangers 
in Judeo-Christian ideology and that between higher-ranking and lower-ranking (e.g. teacher-
disciple, father-son) in Confucianism. 
7.3 Uncertainties over levels and links 
Throughout this paper, we have regarded (im)politeness evaluations as occurring at the interactional 
level and argued that something deeper underlies them. However, as can be seen from Figure 3 
above, Schwartz identifies face as a basic value3, probing it with the following questionnaire items 
(Schwartz et al., 2012, 687, male version): 
Face: 
 It is important to him that no one should ever shame him. 
 Protecting his public image is important to him.  
 He wants people always to treat him with respect and dignity. 
So this raises the question: is face a ‘deep level’ concept that underpins (im)politeness evaluations or 
is it an ‘interactional level’ concept that guides or influences interpersonal interactions and 
assessments? Or are there multiple levels? As mentioned above, Schwartz defines basic values as 
“trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person 
or a group” (Schwartz et al., 2012, 664). This notion of ‘principles’ has resonances with Spencer-
Oatey and Jiang’s (2003) concept of ‘sociocultural interactional principles’ (SIPS), but it is unclear 
how similar or different they are, or the potential synergies between them. 
Other concerns over levels and links are expressed by Fischer and Schwartz (2011: 1140): 
Values are abstract constructs. The attitudinal and behavioural implications associated with 
a value may depend on the context and may differ across societies. Many intercultural 
conflicts or misunderstandings involve situations where either (a) the same or similar values 
map onto different attitudes and behaviors or (b) particular attitudes and behaviors are 
mapped onto different values. […] Consider an example of how a particular behaviour may 
map onto different values. Kissing a nonrelative on the cheek when meeting in public may 
                                                          
3
 This is a new addition and was not included as a value in earlier iterations of his framework. 
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be construed as showing “respect,” “friendship,” and “equality” or as violating “tradition,” 
“decency” and “honor.” Which mapping occurs depends on the social and cultural context. 
So much more research is needed into the factors that influence (im)politeness evaluations and the 
moral order, including what they are and how they interconnect.  
7.4 Limitations 
Within the scope of this paper, there are a number of aspects that we have not been able to explore. 
For example, we have not discussed the impact that emotional factors have on evaluation and how 
they may link with or be distinct from rational evaluations. Similarly, we have not considered the 
impact of intentionality nor the changes that may occur over time in people’s moral order 
conceptions. More research and analysis is clearly needed in all these areas. In addition, further 
research is needed into possible alternative/additional frameworks that could underpin people’s 
moral evaluations. These are likely to include different types of beliefs and ideologies. There is 
clearly a rich agenda for further research.    
8. Concluding comments 
In this paper we have considered (im)politeness evaluation from an interdisciplinary perspective, 
examining it with the help of psychological concepts and frameworks on moral foundations and 
basic values. We have argued that pragmaticists can gain valuable insights into the East-West 
debate, and more broadly into intercultural (im)politeness evaluation, by taking both an etic (top-
down) as well as an emic (bottom-up) approach. We have also argued for the relevance of Haidt’s 
moral foundations framework for considering (im)politeness evaluations and the moral order. 
However, we have noted that there is a need for much greater clarity on the factors that influence 
moral foundations and (im)politeness evaluations, including what they are and how they 
interconnect, and we maintain that this is an important area for future research. We urge 
pragmaticists and psychologists to engage more fully with each other and contribute their respective 
concepts and insights to helping address this challenge. 
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